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Prediction error, or a mismatch between what is expected and what occurs, is a 
fundamental feedback mechanism across modalities including sensory, attention, motivation, 
and associative learning. Identifying what has changed in our environment allows us to 
appropriately direct attention toward new information. In learning tasks, “surprise” – or the 
unexpected occurrence or omission of a biologically relevant event – is thought to act as a 
teaching signal that drives new learning. Neural correlates of prediction error provide 
additional support for a central role in learning. Most famously, striatal dopaminergic neurons 
fire during an unexpected reward, but not to a well-predicted reinforcer (Schultz et al., 1997). 
Yet, these “prediction error” signals may alternatively result from motivation or attentional 
processes (Nasser et al., 2017), suggesting that prediction is not the only information learned 
Pavlovian conditioning.
In their paper in this issue of European Journal of Neuroscience, Walker and colleagues 
(Walker et al., 2019) examine the role of ventrolateral periaqueductal gray (vlPAG) during fear 
conditioning. Specifically, they observed increased firing in vlPAG to a footshock unconditioned 
stimulus (US) after partial reinforcement training, compared with a continuous reinforcement 
condition in which the US is well predicted. This suggests that increased firing in response to 
footshock during uncertainty is a result of prediction error, and not due to the sensory 
properties or salience of the US. Second, they show that inhibition of vlPAG results in a 
decrease in fear-responding in subsequent trials, suggesting that prediction error is necessary 
for maintaining fear responding during uncertainty. Overall this is a neat set of findings that fits 
more-or-less within established narratives for prediction error and learning (Fernández et al., 
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error in Pavlovian conditioning. In particular, what kinds of prediction are generated after 
partial reinforcement, and what other processes drive conditioned responding when the 
outcome is uncertain? 
The assumption that animals learn to predict the occurrence of a biologically salient event 
(the US) stems in large part from the role of prediction error as a teaching signal in quantitative 
learning theories (McNally et al., 2011). Under conditions of continuous reinforcement where 
the US reliably follows the CS, organisms learn to predict the US based from the presence of the 
CS, resulting in conditioned responses triggered by the CS – increasing the ability to retrieve 
food or avoid danger. But after partial reinforcement, the outcome is uncertain: the CS is 
sometimes, but not always, followed by the US. What, then, do animals predict? 
One possibility is that animals learn a probabilistic prediction of US occurrence. If the CS-US 
contingency is 0.375, then animals learn to predict that the probability of receiving the US on 
any given trial is p=0.375. How, then, does this trigger prediction error? If the US occurrence 
either occurs (p=1) or is omitted (p=0), then does every trial generate a prediction error? If the 
animal is already expecting a US on some trials, is the US ever surprising? Or is there an 
accumulation of expectancy across trials, like waiting for a bus, with each non-reinforced trial 
increasing expectancy of shock after the next CS presentation (Glimcher, 2011)? An alternative 
to this probabilistic schema, animals could learn that the CS may or may not be followed by the 
US – and then generate a stochastic guess about US occurrence. Without a prediction about US 
occurrence, neither occurrence nor omission of the US would generate an error signal.  
There are several reasons to doubt a purely predictive account of partial reinforcement. 
First, after partial reinforcement, performance does not reflect a strict probabilistic prediction. 
Fear related behaviors as measured either by conditioned suppression (Walker et al., 2019) or 
by freezing (Huh et al., 2009) are stronger than expected based simply on reinforcement 
probability. This suggests that multiple sources of information, in addition to prediction, drive 
conditioned fear responses. Second, there is strong evidence for a failure to generate 
prediction errors after omission of the US. Conditioned responses after partial reinforcement 
are resistant to extinction after fear conditioning, and animals fail to generate negative 
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that animals become insensitive to the CS-US contingency after partial reinforcement, and that 
factors other than prediction drive conditioned responding.
One largely overlooked contribution to fear conditioning and defensive responses is 
motivational processes. Recent work has demonstrated the importance of learned affective and 
motivational information in Pavlovian conditioning. In appetitive Pavlovian conditioning, for 
example, organisms attribute motivational salience to the CS, resulting in intense wanting 
based on the value of the US representation and the current state of the animal (Berridge, 
2018). Here, motivational or affective information is learned in parallel to predictive 
information, and factors including individual differences (Cogan et al., 2019) and uncertainty 
(Anselme, 2010) determine whether predictive or motivational components of Pavlovian 
associations drive behavior. 
Motivational and emotion-related information likely play analogous roles in fear 
conditioning (Berridge, 2018). Further, there is evidence that motivational processes are critical 
to process uncertain biologically or psychologically significant events (Anselme, 2010) and drive 
increased anxiety under partial reinforcement (Grillon et al., 2006). Previous work in fear 
conditioning supports this idea, demonstrating that motivational or affective learning to a fear 
CS increases after partial reinforcement when prediction is poor (Huh et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, partial but not continuous reinforcement also increases salience of an aversive US 
(Hall et al., 2005), suggesting that uncertainty plays a critical role in modulating motivational 
aspects of both the CS, and the US representation.
Motivation or salience-related information may also explain the vlPAG error-like signaling 
observed in the present study. Because vlPAG also plays multiple roles in complex sensory 
perception, pain and antinociception, as well as salience and fear learning (McNally et al., 
2011), the observed vlPAG may contribute to any one of these processes. For example, 
increased US salience might contribute to the increased neuronal response to a US after partial 
but not continuous reinforcement observed here (Walker et al., 2019). Decreased US salience, 
rather than disruption of prediction error, may also contribute to reduced future fear 
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Here, we suggest that Pavlovian fear memories are multidimensional constructs, with 
elements including motivation, stimulus representation, and value, as well as prediction. The 
relative strength of each memory component varies as a function of training parameters (e.g., 
prediction will be stringer after continuous than partial reinforcement), and influenced by 
factors including individual differences, sex differences, prior experience, and current 
motivational state. By careful experimental dissociation of these processes, we can begin to 
unpack the multiple contributions to vulnerability to dysregulation of memory and pathological 
fear.
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